session
Update 14: Security hardening
Security went from a capability model to a full hardening posture.
- Binary hardening by default: every C-codegen binary ships with stack canaries (
-fstack-protector-strong), PIE/ASLR, full RELRO, and a non-executable stack. No opt-in required. @constant_time: a compile-time defense against timing side channels (Spectre-class and cache-timing attacks). Inside a@constant_timefunction the compiler rejects early returns, IO/network/spawn effects, memory allocation, and calls to non-constant-time functions, transitively.@tainted: parameters marked as untrusted user input cannot flow into dangerous sinks: SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, or file paths.- Stack traces on panic: panics now print the chain of function calls that led there, in both the interpreter and native output.
- “Did you mean?” diagnostics: the typechecker suggests corrections for misspelled variables, functions, methods, and struct fields.